Abstract-The paper uses the uncertainty principle and nocloning theorem; then combines the fundamental properties of quantum mechanics with the cryptographic hash function together; after that proposes a new security quantum blind signature. The analysis of security shows that the improved scheme has the feature of non-forgery, non-disavowal. Compares with other quantum signature, the new scheme needn't to update the signer's transmission private key and it can avoid the signer's private key being exposed by the sender. Moreover, the improved scheme has guiding significance value to further optimal design quantum blind signature and quantum signature, etc.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signature is a technique for verifying the identity of the signer and ensuring the integrity of the information. Blind signature was first proposed by Chaum D in 1983 [1] . In the blind signature protocol, the signer does not know the specific content of the signature message. Because the blind signature has a strong protective on the user's anonymity, it has a wide application in some electronic elections and electronic payments. For example, in the electronic payment, it is necessary for banks to sign e-cash to ensure the anonymity of consumers' personal messages and consumer contents, so blind signatures can well meet this demand. Many blind signatures are based on the difficulty of mathematical problems [2, 3] , but these problems are not unconditional security.
Because quantum cryptography is unconditionally secure, some scholars focus on the research of signature algorithm on quantum cryptography, and propose some quantum blind signature algorithms [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . In this paper, a secure and reliable quantum blind signature scheme is proposed, which combines the basic principles of hash function and quantum mechanics to realize the security of the signature. This paper is organized as follows. In the second section, a new quantum blind signature scheme is proposed, the third section offers the proof of the new algorithm, the fourth section gives the conclusion.
II. THE NEW QUANTUM BLIND SIGNATURE
This paper proposes a new scheme with classical Vername algorithm to ensure that the signer cannot know the message. At the same time, the safety one-way hash function is combined with the basic principles of quantum mechanics, so as to ensure the safety of the system. Here H is a secure oneway hash function, which converts a binary string with indefinite length to a binary string with fixed length of n.
A. Initial Phase
The signer Alice and the trusted center Charlie share the key {0,1}
n AC K  through the key distribution protocol, and the message sender j U ,j∈{1,…… } share the key j K with the trusted center Charlie.
B. Blinding the Message Phase
The paper assumes the message sender j U needs the signer Alice to sign the message M, which is a traditional binary message, and assumes its length is k.
Step B1: the message sender j U randomly selects an integer {0,1} n r  to generate an electronic fingerprint ( || || )
Here || is the connection of two strings
Step B2: For(i=1 to k), the message sender j U uses a Vernam-like encryption method to encrypt messages
with r to generate blind messages M means the ith bit in the original message, so the formula (1) can be described as:
If the message length is less than the length of the hash function (k < n), the blind message is
Step B3: the message sender j U sends the fingerprint
to the signer Alice.
C. Signing the Blind Message Phase
Step S1: the signer Alice receives the fingerprint B R , and
Step S2: Alice generates signatures 
Step S5: Finally, j U sends the final quantum blind signature ( | R  , | S  ) to the trusted center Charlie through the quantum channel. At the same time, the blind message M is also sent to Charlie for signature verification.
D. Verifying Phase
Step V1: Charlie first uses private key j K to recover r' by Step V2: Charlie measure | S  to recover ' A R with the signer's key AC K as Step V1 mentioned.
Step V3: Charlie uses the recovered parameter r' to decrypt the blind message, and recovers the original message M'. For(i=1 to k), Charlie computes
' '
Step V4: Charlie uses the message sender ' 
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF NEW ALGORITHM

A. Sender Is Unable to Perform Known Plaintext Attacks
The trusted center Charlie recovers (M',r', ' 
Similarly hash function H is a security one-way function, if the message sender changed certain qubit in the signature | S  , to the equation 
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Therefore, the new scheme can effectively resist the known plaintext attacks as above mentioned.
B. The Message Receiver Cannot Obtain The Signer's Key
In the Wang-Wen signature scheme [4] , the signer Alice generates the quantum blind signature with AC K and ( || ) H M r , but value of ( || ) H M r is determined by the message sender. Therefore, by measuring the signature of | S  , the key of the Alice is likely to be exposed. 
If the message sender knows the specific value 
it is proved that the equation is established.
Proof: it can be obtained from Table I :
The other equations in equation (6) can be proven as above mentioned. It is obtained by equation (6), if the result of the ith In the same way, in all events, we can know that the occurrence probability of equation (6) is 1 4 . Therefore, after the K round signing the message, the message sender can obtain the signer's key AC K with the probability of (1 (3 / 4) )
, where n is the length of the key AC K [6] .
The new scheme can also prevent the signature key exposure problem [5] . Because the signer Alice generates the quantum blind signature with AC K and ( || )
And without the AC K , the message sender cannot generates ( || ) . Therefore, other attackers cannot make a forgery attack.
D. Non-Repudiation
If the signature is set up, Charlie can be sure that the signer Alice has signed the blind message m. Because at the signing phase, the signature key of the Alice AC K is contained in
.If Alice signs the message correctly, the trusted center Charlie is able to verify the validity of the signature by verifying the
. At the same time, in the new scheme, the message sender cannot make a forgery attack, so if Charlie verifies that the signature is correct, the signer Alice cannot deny that the blind message M has been signed.
In the same way, Charlie can also be sure that the message sender is blind to the message and produces electronic fingerprints ( || || ) 
E. Message Blindness
The Wang-Wen scheme is a weak blind signature. In this scheme, the signer first signs the blind message, after that transmits the signature to the message sender. Then the message sender sends the signature and the original message to the trusted center Charlie to verify the signature. Although the signer signs the blind signature firstly, b But the sender did not encrypt the original message M to the trusted center. So there is still a loophole for the signer to know the original message M:
(1) After receiving the message sender's electronic fingerprint j R , the signer generates an illegal signature | ' S  and transmits the illegal signature | ' S  to the sender.
(2) When the sender sends the quantum blind signature( | R  , | ' S  ) and the original message M to the trusted center, the signer Alice intercepts the M , so that the content of the original message M can be obtained.
Because | '
S  is an illegal signature, the trusted center judges the signature is illegal. As long as the trusted center let the sender resign the message, so the signer can know the content of the original message M In the new scheme, even if the signer interceptes the blind message M, the signer Alice could not get the original message M. Suppose the message length is k, and the length of the message sender's parameter r is n.
If
k<=n, the blinded message If k>n, the encryption method is similar to the Vernam encryption method, when the signer intercepts the encrypted message m, it can be obtained ( )
